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BUT WHEN DID HE DIE?:
TUCKER v. LOWER AND THE
BRAIN-DEATH CONCEPT
The surgeons sat anxiously before the bench as the judge charged
the jury,
".... you shall determine the time of death in this case by using
the following definition of the nature of death. Death is a cessa-
tion of life. It is the ceasing to exist. Under the law, death is not
continuing but occurs at a precise time .... In determining ..
you may consider the following elements . .. [among them] the
time of complete and irreversible loss of all function of the brain."'
Thus, in May of 1972, in the case of Tucker's Administrator v.
Lower2 was the unprecedented final jury instruction given on
"brain death" in the nation's first court decision involving a heart
transplant. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant
transplant surgeons in a wrongful death action brought by the do-
nor's brother.3 Because it was only the decision of a trial court,
the Tucker case 4 obviously lacks precedential value. Nonetheless,
it represents an historical landmark decision in the development
of a new legal definition of death.5 By their decision in Tucker,
the jury, in effect, found that death occurs when the brain dies,
not when circulation and respiration cease,0 thereby exonerating
the four physicians who had been accused of removing the heart
of a living donor for a transplant. This result represented a con-
siderable departure from the existing statutory definition of death
in Virginia at the time, but was a logical extension of the recent
advances in medical knowledge and understanding of the nature
of death prompted by the successes of vital organ transplant sur-
gery in the 1960's.
1. Tucker's Administrator v. Lower, No. 2831 (Ct. Law & Eq., Rich-
mond, Va., May 25, 1972); in THE NATIONAL OBSERVER, June 3, 1972, at 1,
col. 1.
2. Id.
3. Comment, The Criteria for Determining Death in Vital Organ Trans-
plants-A Medicolegal Dilemma, 38 Mo. L. REV. 220 (1973).
4. Or "the Richmond brain case" as it has come to be called.
5. Fletcher, New Definitions of Death, PRIsM, January, 1974, at 13.
6. When is Life Out of the Physician's ands?, AmEYiCAN MEDICAL NEWS,
January 15, 1973, at 10.
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In order to better understand the reasons for the jury's finding
as they did in Tucker, its medicolegal impact and ramifications, the
facts of the case and the developments at trial must be considered.
This article will also examine existing state statutes (in Kansas,
Maryland, and most recently California) 7 that have incorpor-
ated the concept of brain death and a proposed model statute to
establish a new legal definition of death consistent with Tucker and
current medical thinking.
Tucker v. Lower: THE FACTS
8
Bruce 0. Tucker was a 56 year old black male resident of Rich-
mond, Virginia, who was separated from his wife and 15 year old
son. He had worked for an egg-packing plant for some 25 years
and was described by 'his foreman as being "a good employee".9
Late on the Friday afternoon of May 24, 1968, Tucker was sitting
at a local gas station talking with a friend; Tucker had been drink-
ing. While attempting to stand up, he fell forward and struck his
head on the station's concrete apron. The friend called an ambu-
lance to take him to the hospital, but Tucker refused and stumbled
off. The ambulance picked him up some time later, however, and
took him to the Medical College of Virginia (hereinafter MCV)
Hospital's emergency room, where he was admitted, alone at 6:05
P.M. In the hospital at the -time was Joseph Klett, Jr., a retired
white purchasing agent, who would figure significantly in the
course of Tucker's hospitalization and ultimately in medicolegal his-
tory.
At 11:00 P.M. a craniotomy (opening of the skull) was performed
on Bruce Tucker to relieve brain hemorrhaging and edema (swell-
ing). A tracheotomy (incision in the wind-pipe) was also done
to facilitate breathing, and he was returned to his room at 2:05
A.M. on the morning 'of May 25, 1968, where his condition was des-
cribed as "slightly improved". Intravenous feedings (IV's) were
being administered and he continued receiving medication until
11:30 A.M., when he was placed on a respirator, presumably because
7. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1971); ANN. CODE MD. Art. 43 §
54 F., (Supp. 1973); A.B. 3560, Aug. 21, 1974, amending CAL. HEALTH & S.
CODE §§ 7180-82 (West 1954).
8. Adapted from When Does Life End? by Mosher, THE NATIONAL OB-
SERVER, June 3, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
9. Id. at 18.
of respiratory distress. Shortly before this, at about 10:00 A.M.,
Dr. Abdullah Fatteh, then deputy state medical examiner, and one
of the physicians later to be indicted, told future co-defendant Dr.
David M. Hume (chief of MCV's department of surgery) that he
should attempt to locate Tucker's family to obtain permission to
use his heart and kidneys for transplantation purposes. However,
no immediate action was apparently taken on this recommendation.
The patient's condition must have been felt sufficiently grave the
night before (i.e., May 24) that another member of the transplant
team10 had already notified the police at midnight in an attempt
to contact the family.
At 11:45 A.M. on May 25th, Tucker's attending physician noted
in his chart that "prognosis for recovery is nil and death im-
minent."" Shortly thereafter, MCV staff neurologist, and later
co-defendant, Dr. Hooshang Hooshman, was called in to examine
the patient and an EEG (electroencephalogram, or brain-wave re-
cording) was run; on the basis of a 25-minute EEG tracing, Dr.
Hooshman concluded that Tucker's brain 12 was dead. It was also
determined that Tucker's heartbeat, pulse, blood pressure and tem-
perature were "normal for his condition." He was, however, unable
to breathe without assistance of the respirator. Dr. Hume was then
apprised to Tucker's condition and at about 2:00 P.M. again called
the police to try to notify Tucker's family. Some 30 minutes later
the police returned the call indicating their inability to reach
Tucker's next of kin, whereupon the patient was returned to the op-
erating room to be prepared for transplantation of his heart and
kidneys: the die was cast. At 3:30 P.M. the respirator was discon-
nected by the attending physician and there being no spontaneous
respirations for a 5-minute period, Tucker was pronounced dead. 18
At 3:40 P.M. on May 25, 1968, Dr. Hume called Dr. Fatteh to
report that Tucker had expired, whereupon the medical examiner
gave permission to remove Bruce Tucker's heart and transplant it
into the body of Joseph Klett, Jr.
10. Id. The identity of the individual was not mentioned in Mosher's
report.
11. Id.
12. Or more correctly, the cerebral cortex, since it is the function of this
area of the brain that is measured by the EEG.
13. Comment, supra note 3, at 223. Although three to six minute an-
oxic (without oxygen) survival maxima are cited by this Comment, the so-
called "four-minute threshold" is most commonly employed in clinical prac-
tice; if anoxia has persisted (by way of absent respiration and heartbeat)
for four minutes or longer, efforts at resuscitation should probably be termi-
nated since brain damage (cerebral cortical function) will be permanent
and irreversible at this point.
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It is of interest to note that during the "critical period" (11:45
A.M. - 3:00 P.M.) in which relatives were being sought to obtain
permission for transplantation, that a woman friend of Tucker's was
roaming the corridors of the MCV 'hospital complex trying to find
him, but without success. Furthermore, Tucker's brother, William,
a shoe repairman, whose shop was only 15 blocks from the medical
center, was not contacted, despite the fact that his business card
and phone number were in his brother's wallet and available to
the hospital authorities.
It was this very lack of notice and consent that probably pro-
voked the suit filed by the brother, as administrator of Tucker's
estate. However, the issue of consent, by either donors or their
survivors, to transplant vital organs was not raised in the Tucker
trial because of a legal technicality, the running of the statute of
limitations. The MCV surgical team had relied in the Tucker case,
as in others before, upon the State of Virginia's "Unclaimed Body
Act",14 which permits the state medical examiner to donate un-
claimed bodies to medical schools and .hospitals for educational and
scientific purposes.15 However, the statute also requires that the
body be held at least 24 hours to permit a reasonable search for
next of kin.16 Such a delay would obviously preclude most trans-
plant procedures. 17 Bruce Tucker's body was not held for the 24-
hour period mandated by the statute; indeed, less than four hours
after he was adjudged "neurologically dead" by Dr. Hooshman,
Tucker's heart was placed in a bucket of iced saline solution in prep-
aration for implantation into the recipient, Klett. Despite this ap-
parent violation of the law, the question could not be litigated be-
cause consent for transplantation involves a personal right under
Virginia law and the suit was not filed until after the one year
statute of limitations on personal rights suits had expired.'
8
14. CODE OF VIRGINIA 1950 § 32-356 (Supp. 1974).
15. Mosher, supra note 8, at 18.
16. Id.
17. One authority states, "It is estimated the surgeon has only ten min-
utes to remove a heart, liver or lung from the donor and transplant it into
the donee." Wasmuth, The Concept of Death, 30 OHIo ST. U. L.i. 32, 36
(1969). While cryo (cold) preservation and other techniques may prolong
the viability of the organ, it has been noted by the Journal of Forensic
Medicine that, " ... [in a patient dead for two hours] organs removed
from such a donor will be of notherapeutic use at all [because of deteriora-
tion and biochemical changes]." 16 J. FOR. MED. 1 (Jan. 1969).
18. Mosher, supra note 8, at 18.
Nonetheless, William Tucker did file a tort action for wrongful
death, naming as defendants Dr. Richard H. Lower, chief operating
surgeon in the Tucker-Klett transplant, Dr. David H. Sewall, his
assistant, Dr. Hume, Dr. Fatteh, and ten other physicians involved
in the operation. A total of $1,000,000 in damages was sought.
Tucker was represented by State Senator Lawrence Douglas Wil-
der.19
Tim TRIAL: "THE RicimOi BRAm CASE"
Trial was commenced in Richmond's Law and Equity Court, a
"somber old granite courthouse" 20 on May 18, 1968. A jury of seven
white businessmen heard the case, under the watchful guidance of
Judge A. Christian Compton, whose ultimate instruction on the
definition of death would begin to write a new chapter in medicole-
gal practice. The drama that unfolded over the seven-day period
of the trial was heightened by the coincidental meeting of some
150 transplant surgeons at a hotel only a few blocks from the court-
house.
Since this was a wrongful death action, one of the fundamental
questions raised was when did death occur? Dr. Fatteh, relying
upon the conclusions of Dr. Hooshman, the neurologist, had deter-
mined that Bruce Tucker was in fact dead when his brain functions
had been shown by EEG to have ceased. The plaintiffs contended
this decision was incorrect and that according to law Tucker was
still alive at the time his heart was removed from his body, for
he still had a heartbeat, respiration (albeit artificially maintained),
blood pressure, and body temperature.
At the outset of the trial, Judge Compton had decided that it
was the court's duty to apply and interpret the existing Virginia
law on when death occurs. This definition of death coincided with
that of Black's Law Dictionary, which states that,
11... [death is] a total stoppage of the circulation of the blood,
and a cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent thereto
such as respiration and pulsation."
21
Compton therefore held, in the traditional conservative justice's
fashion, that if medical opinion has swung in favor of a neurological
definition- i.e., "brain or coma death"-this new position should be
a question for the legislature, not the courts. Midway through the
19. Wilder, like his client, was also black, and there were some early
fears that racial factors might influence the case; fortunately, this seems
not to have happened.
20. Mosher, supra note 8, at 1.
21. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 488 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
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trial the judge ruled that he would "adopt the legal concept of
death and reject" the defense's attempt to develop the medical con-
cept of "neurological death as establishing a rule of law."22 This
announcement quickly silenced the courtroom, since it virtually
assured that the jury would be compelled to reach a verdict adverse
to the accused physicians.
However, the passage of time, reflection, and possibly the testi-
mony of witnesses and arguments of counsel must have softened
Judge Compton's views on the issue, for in the end, his jury charge,
quoted above, included both the legal and medical definitions of
death and ultimately allowed the jury to decide which should apply.
They seemed to have little difficulty deciding, for some 77 minutes
after the judge's charge, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
transplant surgeons, clearly relying on the "brain-death" concept.
That they did so is readily apparent from their comments on being
interviewed after trial: One juryman stated that, "It was clearly
proved in the trial a man . .. cannot live without a functioning
brain. ' 23 Another jury member suggested that the existing legal
definition of when death occurs was no longer acceptable.
The jury did not, it should be admitted, appear to understand
the depth of the question they were deciding, nor the concept of
"brain death" itself as well as they might have. For example, the
presence of a "flat (or isoelectric) EEG" is not conclusive evidence
of death, nor even of brain death much less actual death:24 the EEG
measure only cerebral (or upper brain, cortical) function. Thus, es-
pecially where spontaneous cardiac (heart) action and/or respira-
tion persists there is evidence of continued brainstem (lower brain)
function although the EEG may be "flat".25 But is this kind of
strictly vegetative brain activity one which deserves to be main-
tained artificially for days, weeks or months when there is
no other element of humanity present in the patient? On this
question of "quality of life" the Tucker jury was permitted to hear
a rather unusual witness for a medical case: Dr. Joseph Fletcher,
Ph.D., professor of medical ethics at the University of Virginia, a
theologian, philosopher and author. As a non-physician, Fletcher's
22. Mosher, supra note 8, at 18.
23. Id. This was not clearly demonstrated at trial.
24. Hirsh, The Most Unvital Sign: The Stopped Heart v. The Isoelectric
Brain, 3 MEDIcAL DnvaxsIoxs 23, July/Aug., 1974, at 24.
25. Id.
grounds for testifying were sharply challenged by Tucker's attor-
ney, Senator Wilder, but in the end the philosopher prevailed.
Fletcher stated to the court in essence that,
"... When [cerebral function] is gone, nothing remains but
biological phenomena at best. The patient is gone even if his body
remains and even if some of its vital functions continue.20
That is, a patient might still be technically "alive" but no longer
"human." For it is the extensive development of the frontal
lobes of the brain, the cerebral cortex, that distinguishes men from
sub-human animals. As to time of death, Fletcher posed the ques-
tion recently as follows:
"When, then, should a person be considered dead? The death of
the individual is the irreversible loss of whatever component in his
biological system holds the essence of the person and that compo-
nent is the cerebrum . . . not the whole brain. This is the crucial
point....
[I]t is cerebral [not visceral] function that is the key to
'authentically human life' and therefore the key to human death. 27
Tucker: et seque~lae
What are the implications of the decision in Tucker v. Lower?
Unfortunately, they are not as clear-cut as one might hope. Since
the jury was given considerable latitude and was not compelled to
accept brain death, Virginia still still has no guiding law on the
subject.2 8 And even an appellate decision in Tucker will be binding,
in the strict legal sense, only in Virginia.2 9 Other states will have
to go through the same slow and painstaking decisional process
unless circumvented by statute, as in Kansas and Maryland 30
and (in 1974) California.31 That some sort of statutory guide-
line of brain death is essential and should be evident from case-
holdings such as that in Gray v. Sawyer.32 Though not a recent
case, the judge's reasoning in rejecting the concept of brain death
seems even more far-fetched, from a medical standpoint, than
26. Fletcher, supra note 5, at 14.
27. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
28. A recent amendment to the Virginia codes apparently delegates the
power to the state medical examiner to apply the criteria of brain death
in specific cases, upon request. Hirsch, supra note 24 (personal conversa-
tion). The current status of this legislation had not been determined as
of the date this article went to press.
29. Mills, Statutory Brain Death?, 229 J.A.M.A. 1225, Aug. 26, 1974.
30. Id.
31. A.B. 3560, Aug. 21, 1974, amending CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 7180-82
(West 1954).
32. 247 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952).
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the legal fiction of the "fertile octogenarian"; it is indicative of the
illogical lengths to which the law will proceed in order to protect
an established concept. In Sawyer the court held that, although
the victim had been decapitated she was still alive because of testi-
mony that blood was spurting from the body!33
In short, one can not necessarily rely on instructions as liberal
as Judge Compton's in Tucker v. Lower as being typical, nor even
of the jury's finding in favor of brain death as being representative.
In fact, a 1968 survey in the Journal of the American Medical Asso-
ciation indicated that the majority of the public still held to the
traditional notions of death: some 67% felt death was correlated
with cessation of cardiopulmonary (heart-lung) functions, while
only 9% thought of death in terms of irreversible cerebral damage.34
The findings of the Tucker jury become all the more remarkable
in view of this survey. The probability is thus considerable that
a jury even today would be likely to reject the brain death cri-
teria-even if presented with it as an alternative choice. Further-
more, judges are not generally disposed to accept new and relatively
untested concepts: e.g., two California municipal judges recently
dismissed criminal charges in cases wherein death was brought a-
bout by termination of life-support measures; both judges conten-
ded that "brain death" is not defined and acceptable under Califor-
nia law.35 Thus it might reasonably be concluded that the likeli-
hood of a jury's rejection of the brain death notion "would be elim-
inated only if the courts accepted brain death as the sole criterion
for determining death.13 6 But while this degree of exclusivity may
not be absolutely necessary, it is apparent that some sort of clarifi-
cation is in order.
STATUTORY DEVELOPiENTS
Certainly the most reasonable and rapid method of creating a new
definition of death which would be adequate to meet the needs of
both the courts and the transplant surgeons is by statute. A legis-
33. Id. at 497.
34. Arnold, Zimmerman and Marks, Public Attitudes and the Diagnosis
of Death, 206 J.A.M.A. 1949 (1968).
35. Hirsh, supra note 24, at 24. Obviously, this situation has changed
with the recent change in the California law.
36. Comment, supra note 3, at 233.
lative enactment provides the persuasive force of definitive law
which would eliminate the necessity of the courts having to dismiss
or defer to the insecurities of a jury's interpretation as to what
death is and when it occurred. Ideally, a statute would increase the
level of certainty and uniformity in decisions by the courts on the
question of time of death and the factors to be considered in deter-
mining that someone is legally and medically dead.
Interestingly enough, considering that most transplants are done
elsewhere, Kansas was the first state to enact such a new statutory
definition of death:
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the
opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical
practice, there is the absence of spontaneous respiratory and car-
diac function and, because of the disease or condition which caused
directly or indirectly, these functions to cease, or because of the
passage of time since these functions ceased, attempts at resusci-
itation are considered hopeless; and, in this event, death will have
occurred at the time these functions ceased; or
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the
opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical prac-
tice, there is the absence of spontaneous brain function; and if
based on ordinary standards of medical practice, during reason-
able attempts to either maintain or restore spontaneous circulatory
or respiratory function in the absence of aforesaid brain function,
it appears that further attempts at resuscitation or supportive main-
tenance will not succeed, death will have occurred at the time when
these conditions first coincide. Death is to be pronounced before
artificial means of supporting respiratory and circulatory function
are terminated and before any vital organ is removed for purposes
of transplantation.
These alternative definitions of death are to be utilized for all
purposes in the State, including the trials of civil and criminal
cases, any laws to the contrary notwithstanding.37
The Kansas statute of 1971 was followed verbatim by Maryland in
1972,28 although the language seems hardly worthy of such emula-
tion.
The chief criticism levelled at the Kansas/Maryland statutes has
been their attempt to resolve too many collateral issues simulta-
neously, and their creation of alternative definitions of death. 9
Practically speaking, the Kansas model simply seems unnecessarily
verbose and decidedly lacking in both precision and informative au-
thority.
37. KA. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1971).
38. ANx. CODE MD. art. 43, § 54 F (Supp. 1973).
39. Hirsh, supra note 24, at 24.
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In one such criticism of the above-quoted statutes, the authors
of a 1972 University of Pennsylvania Law Review article offered
a "proposed model statute" which reads as follows:
A person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of
a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, he
has experienced an irreversible cessation of spontaneous res-
piratory and circulatory functions. In the event that artificial
means of support preclude a determination that these functions
have ceased, a person will be considered dead if in the announced
opinion of a physician, based upon ordinary standards of medical
practice, he has experienced an irreversible cessation of spontan-
eous brain functions. Death will have occurred at the time when
the relevant functions ceased.
40
Here, although there has been some improvement on the Kansas-
type statute, the appearance of differing criteria for determining
death is retained, based upon the presence or absence of artificial
life-support. According to Don Harper Mills, probably one of the
foremost experts on medicolegal problems today,
The great stumbling block has been the necessity to feel that a
brain-death statute must be an explicit definition; whereas the only
need is to establish the legality of the concept of brain death.
41
California has provided the most recent addition to the growing
number of states that have confronted the brain-death question by
statute, having enacted on September 27, 1974, sections 7180-7182
of the Health and Safety Code, portions of which are as follows:
7180. A person shall be pronounced dead if it is determined by
a physician that the person has suffered a total and irreversible ces-
sation of brain function. There shall be independent confirmation
of the death by another physician.
Nothing in this chapter shall prohibit a physician from using
other usual and customary procedures for determining death as the
exclusive basis for pronouncing a person dead.
7181. When a part of the donor is used for organ transplantation
... and the death of the donor is determined by... cessation of
brain function, there shall be an independent confirmation of the
death by another physician. Neither the physician making the de-
termination of death under Section 7155.5 nor the physician making
the independent confirmation shall participate in the procedures for
removing or transplanting a part.
42
40. Capron and Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Deter-
mining Human Death, 121 U. PENN. L. Rv. 87 (1972).
41. Mills, supra note 29, at 1226.
42. A.B. 3560, Aug. 21, 1974, amending CAL. HELTH & S. CODE §§ 7180-82
(West 1954). Denominated an "urgency statute" it is effective immediately.
While the California version of the brain-death statute is a stylis-
tic improvement upon the Kansas model, it still retains the alterna-
tive criteria criticized by Mills. What would have been pre-
ferable is the proposal submitted to the legislature by the attorney-
general's office, namely that,
A person may be pronounced dead if, based on usual and custom-
ary standards of medical practice, it is determined that the person
has suffered an irreversible cessation of brain function.43
This latter definition has the beauty of simplicity, yet at the same
time is broad enough to provide for any additional refinements
that may be made in detrmining the precise criteria to be applied
in reaching a diagnosis of "irreversible cessation of brain function";
it does not, however, preclude judicial scrutiny of the standards
applied. This should have been adequate to protect the rights of
individuals from the over-zealous, "organ-hungry" or unscrupulous
surgeon. It is unfortunate that the lawmakers in Sacramento were
so skeptical of physicians as to require the double-and disinter-
ested-certification standard. Whether the alternative definition
portion will create any problems remains to be seen, but at least it
is couched in terms which permit the physician to apply medical
rather than legal standards for determining when death has oc-
curred. But most importantly, there is now the specific authoriza-
tion of the law in California to apply the criteria of brain death,
which should once again dispel the uncertainties in the courts and
restore the confidence of both the public and the transplant sur-
geons.
However, in the final analysis, it may not be the doctor, the law-
yer or society which will be most clearly benefitted by the wide-
spread application of a new definition of death, but rather the ag-
onal and moribund patient, whose personal wishes are all too often
forgotten in the sometimes frantic efforts made to prolong his
"life". According to Fletcher, today's dying patients,
... die comatose, betubed and sedated and aerated and glucosed
and non compos mentis. It has come to be a pretty ugly
business.44
In short, the availability of a statute defining death neurologi-
cally (i.e., "brain-death") and which protected the physician might
well facilitate decisions to "pull the plug", i.e., terminate artificial
life support systems, and give the patient as well as his relatives
43. Mills, supra note 29, at 1226.
44. When Is Life out of the Physician's Hands?, AmFRcAN MEDICAL NEws,
January 15, 1973, at 10, col. 1.
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once again the right to die with dignity, a concept which is rapidly
gaining support in the medical community. Neither the dying pa-
tient nor the practicing physician or attorney should have to wait
for future Tucker cases to resolve this dilemma. The solution lies
in the hands of the legislatures.
RONALD CONVERSE, M.D.
